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SPECIAL PROJECT
OBTAINING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER ALIEN CORPORATIONSA SURVEY OF U.S. PRACTICE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe v.
Washington,' the states have sought to employ their long-arm statutes so as to more effectively exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Illinois was the first state to codify this new standard;2
the other states eventually followed Illinois by adopting their own
long-arm statutes.:' Although the Court's ruling in Hanson v.
Denckla' limited jurisdiction to cases where the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State," 5 the trend to allow jurisdiction over foreign persons was quite clear.'
While most states base their long-arm statute on the Illinois
statute,7 a few have adopted the Uniform Interstate and Internal. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Supreme Court stated: ". . . due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" 326 U.S. at 316.
2. Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 533, 537 (1963).
3. Id. A survey and list of all state long-arm statutes appears in 26 CoRP. J.,

No. 4, at 75 (1970).
4.

357 U.S. 235 (1958).

5. 357 U.S. at 253.
6. In McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Supreme
Court sustained jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of a single life
insurance policy with a resident of the forum state. In Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the Illinois
Supreme Court allowed jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose product
was sold in Illinois by another company which had incorporated defendant's
product in its own.
7. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 17 (1963).
Act submitting to jurisdiction - Process
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representatives, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of such acts:
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tional Procedure Act' which is similar to the Illinois statute in
many respects. Delaware appears to have a more conservative approach to the assumption of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
as its long-arm statute predicates the assumption of jurisdiction on
the transaction of business within Delaware,9 but even here, the
statute indicates an intent to adopt a liberal interpretation of what
constitutes a business transaction.'0 Individual differences exist

between the various statutes" but the goal of most is to pursue
jurisdiction to the full limit allowed by due process.'2
With the increase in international trade, civil litigation between
persons of different nationalities has become increasingly important.'3 Today alien'" and foreign corporations' 5 are being brought
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in
this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within
this State at the time of contracting;
(e) With respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance, the
maintenance in this State of a matrimonial domicle at the time the
cause of action arose or the commission in this State of any act giving
rise to the cause of action.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as
provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though summons had
been personally served within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is
based upon this Section.
(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.

8. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (U.L.A.).
9. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 382 (1974).
10. Gentry v. Wilmington Trust Co., 321 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (D.Del. 1970).
11. 26 CORP. J., No. 4, at 75 (1970).
12. See WEST'S ANN. C.C.P. § 410.10 (West 1973): "A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States." California's long-arm statute probably carries
jurisdiction to the greatest possible extent. But see N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § C302:1
(McKinney 1971).
13. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (U.L.A.), Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 279.
14. For the purposes of this article an alien corporation is a company incorporated in a country other than the United States.
15. For the purposes of-this article a foreign corporation is a corporation for-
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before American courts to defend actions arising out of products
liability,'" contract,'7 and tort.', There is considerable authority
holding alien and foreign corporations amenable to jurisdiction on
the basis of a single act or business transaction.'" The states themselves are affecting international trade since state law is chosen to
determine the amenability of alien and foreign corporations to suit
in diversity actions in federal court.'9
This survey persents a cross-section of recent cases and attempts
to distinguish the treatment given alien corporations from the
treatment given foreign corporations. While a variety of actions is
represented, the majority of the cases deal with products liability.
Generally, these cases concern an alien corporation's contacts with
a particular state, although some courts might look to contacts
with the United States as a whole in determining whether to assume jurisdiction in some types of cases. 2' Recurrent considerations which appear throughout include: (1) whether the corporation has availed itself of the privilege of conducting business
within the forum state; (2) whether the corporation knew its product was destined for the forum state; (3) whether the assumption
of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play; (4)
whether the plaintiff could realistically bring suit in the alien
forum; (5) whether the alien corporation set its product in the
normal stream of commerce; and (6) whether an American corporation is an alter ego of the alien corporation. While these considerations are largely derived from the major cases in which suit was
brought against foreign corporations in a particular state, the
courts balance the same considerations and apply the same standards to alien corporations in determining whether jurisdiction is
proper. However, it has been advocated that a different standard
should be applied in cases where alien corporations are involved. 2
eign to a particular state which may or may not be incorporated in a jurisdiction
within the United States.
16. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969);
Annot. 19 A.L.R.3d 13 (1968).
17. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Annot. 23 A.L.R.3d 551
(1969).
18. Annot. 24 A.L.R.3d 532 (1969).
19. Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965);
Annot. 20 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1968); Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 397 (1969).
20. Mack Trucks Inc., v. Arrow Aluminum Castings Co., 510 F.2d 1029, 1031
(5th Cir. 1975); Annot. 6 A.L.R.3d 1103 (1966).
21. Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). See,
Comment, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (1976).
22. See Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
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Arguments against extending the reach of the long-arm statute
to alien corporations focus on fears that such jurisdiction will harm
international relations, place an undue burden on foreign commerce, or violate ideas of fundamental fairness.- The difficulty of
enforcing a judgment against an alien corporation has also been
noted in arguing against the extension of jurisdiction. 2 Some Bri-

tish Commonwealth countries have taken a restrictive attitude
toward assuming jurisdiction over alien corporations in tort
claims.2" Civil law countries such as France and Germany seem to
be in line with the majority American view, 26 and even in the
British Commonwealth there seems to be a desire for a greater
2
jurisdictional reach over alien persons.
The following cases are illustrative of the expansion of the longarm statute to reach alien corporations. This "international longarm" is an important development which reflects a significant
departure from the principle actor sequiturforum rei ("the plaintiff follows the forum of the defendant"). 28 The American states
were not the first jurisdictions to assault this doctrine, 29 but they
have brought the alien corporation much closer to the American
plaintiff than ever before and consequently lessened national
boundaries as a barrier to litigation.
1969) (dissenting opinion).
23. Note, Civil Procedure-LongArm Statutes-JurisdictionoverAlien Manufacturers in Products Liability Actions, 18 WAYNE L.R. 1585, 1589 (1972).
24. Id.
25. Bisset-Johnson, JurisdictionOver the Manufacturerof Imported Goods in
Cases of Negligence-The British Commonwealth Approach, 48 CANADIAN B.R.
548 (1970); Lowenfeld & Ehrlich, InternationalPrivate Trade, 65 INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIc LAW, Part 1, (1975).
26. 18 WAYNE L. REV., supra note 23, at 1591.
27. Bissett-Johnson, supra note 25, at 560-61.
Clearly an international convention by which the signatories agreed to take
jurisdiction (and recognize foreign courts' judgments) over overseas manufacturers of defective goods, either causing damage within the jurisdiction
of the forum, or where they were used or purchased within the jurisdiction
but where the damage was sustained elsewhere, would seem desirable. Such
an assertion of jurisdiction would probably be confined to cases in which it
was reasonable for the foreign manufacturer to foresee the use of the product within the jurisdiction in question or that damage might result in the

particular jurisdiction.
28. Lowenfeld, note 25 supra.
29. Id.

JURISDICTION
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II.

SURVEY

ALABAMA

Elkhart EngineeringCorporationv. DornierWerke, 343 F.2d 861
(5th Cir. 1965). Defendant German corporation, Dornier Werke,
borrowed an airplane from plaintiff Wisconsin corporation during
an air demonstration for potential buyers. With the exception of
the air demonstration in question, neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant conducted any business in Alabama. The defendant
contended its presence in Alabama was insufficient to subject it to
personal jurisdiction in Alabama. The Alabama long-arm statute
allows service on a non-resident, non-qualifying corporation which
performs any work or service in the State." The Court of Appeals
reversed the district court and upheld service since the defendant
had availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Alabama and should therefore reasonably be expected to defend a suit
arising out of such activities. Drawing analogy to cases involving
jurisdiction over non-resident motorists and vessels, 3 ' the court
reasoned that due process was not violated where the state afforded a remedy against persons committing torts during a single
business transaction within the state.
CALIFORNIA

daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789,
57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967). Defendant, a German corporation, manufactured a cream separator which exploded and killed plaintiff's
son. The machine sold with unlimited title to an independent nonexclusive distributor, Centrico, Inc., a New York corporation. Distributor Centrico listed defendant's product in the San Francisco
telephone directory. The machine was returned to defendant after
the explosion. Defendant moved to quash service in actions for
negligence and breach of warranty in the wrongful death of plaintiff's son, claiming that it was not doing business under the
California long-arm statute.3 2 The court affirmed the denial of
service, finding no significant contacts by defendant. Since Westphalia's only business dealings in the United States were with
Centrico, which accepted the goods without a distribution agreeALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199(1) (1958).
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199 (1958).
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6500-04, 6501 (West 1955); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
411(2) (repealed 1970) (now CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (West 1973).
30.
31.
32.

§
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ment, and since defendant did not avail itself of the privilege of
conducting business in California, the court reasoned traditional
notions of fair play would be offended were the defendant to be
held amenable to personal service. In denying jurisdiction, the
court noted that plaintiff might still sue the distributor under
theories of strict liability and breach of warranty. 3
Shoei Kaka Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, San Francisco,33 Cal.
App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973). Defendant Japanese
Corporation, Shoei Kaka Co., Ltd., sought to quash service of summons in a products liability action which alleged that defendant
had negligently manufactured a motor cycle helmet. Defendant
contended that the court was without jurisdiction, that the method
of service was not in accordance with a multilateral treaty34 governing service, and that due process was violated because the service
of process documents were ii English instead of Japanese. The
California Court of Appeals rejected these contentions, finding
that defendant's activities in the sale of helmets were sufficient to
render it amenable to jurisdiction in California. 5 The multilateral
treaty governing service abroad was not violated where service was
made directly to defendant by mail and defendant signed receipt.
Noting that almost all Japanese corporations trading abroad corresponded in English and that defendant had used the English
language in sales brochures, the court found service of process
3
adequate. "

Beirut UniversalBank S.A.L. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App.
832, 74 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1969). Plaintiffs, Orbi, S.A., a Swiss corporation, and William Forman, sought rescission of agreements and
damages for fraud from defendant Lebanese banking association,
Beirut Universal Bank, S.A.L. and Selim Habib. Defendant bank
moved to quash service of summons. Plaintiffs contended defendant was doing business in California, since a loan had been negotiated and agreed to there and since defendant's officer had alleg33. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal.2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969); Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-arm Jurisdictionin California Under
New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,21 HAST. L.J. 1163 (1970).
34. Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, April 24, 1967,
[1969] 1 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
35. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 410.10 (West 1973).
36. See Lotus Car Ltd. v. Municipal Ct., 263 Cal. App.2d 264, 69 Cal. Rptr.
384 (Ct. App. 1968); James R. Twiss, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 215 Cal. App.2d 247,
30 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Regie Nationale des Usines Renault v.
Superior Ct., 208 Cal. App.2d 702, 25 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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edly made fraudulent misrepresentations while there. Defendant
bank denied that it owned property or was doing business in California. The court held the bank was subject to jurisdiction in California because its activities in negotiating and signing the loan
constituted doing business." The court reasoned that a contract
provision stipulating Lebanese jurisdiction for disputes arising out
of the contract did not divest the California court of jurisdiction
where the California courts otherwise would have jurisdiction.
Since the bank contemplated a continuing relationship, the fact

that its officer had left the state was not controlling. Although
admitting inconvenience to the alien bank, the court discounted
this inconvenience in light of modern communication and transportation.
COLORADO

Alliance Clothing Ltd. v. District Court, 532 P.2d 351 (Colo.
1975). Plaintiff alleged that the poor construction of ski pants
manufactured by the defendant aggravated injuries in a skiing
accident and sought jurisdiction under Colorado's long-arm statute. "8 Plaintiff contended that defendant's failure to manufacture
a proper garment constituted a tortious act within the meaning of
the statute. Defendant sought to have service quashed claiming
that it had no contacts with Colorado. Plaintiff had purchased the
pants from a local ski shop, whose distributor had purchased the
pants from defendant overseas. The court held that if a manufacturer can reasonably foresee that its product will be used in the
United States, and if it places that product in the stream of commerce, it does not violate due process to require the manufacturer
to defend itself in the forum where the injury occurs. Noting that
the same allegations would support jurisdiction in the case of a
foreign corporation, the court reasoned that a different holding
would allow alien corporations to escape liability for their torts by
structuring their sales so as to technically remain outside the
United States.39 Additionally, the court distinguished foreign and

alien corporations by establishing a less stringent contacts rule for
alien corporations. Corporations must have minimum contacts
37. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6500-04 (West 1955); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411(2),
(repealed 1970) (now CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 410.10) (West 1973).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-24(1)(a)-(b), 25 (1973). The Illinois statute is
similar.
39. For the major arguments against the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction
against alien corporations, see 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1585 (1972).
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with Colorado before the court will take jurisdiction, while a foreign alien corporation need only have contacts with the United
States.
CONNECTICUT

Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn.
1975). Plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation, brought an action for
patent infringement against defendant English corporation.' Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint claiming that the application of Connecticut's long-arm statute4 ' to its activities was unconstitutional. Plaintiff contended that solicitation and sale of defendant's products within the forum by American distributors was
enough to satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts. Alternatively, the plaintiff urged that the court look at Spembly's contacts
with the United States as a: whole in deciding the question of
minimum contacts. The court held that when a federal court is
asked to exercise personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant sued
on a claim arising out of federal law, jurisdiction may appropriately be determined on the basis of the alien's aggregated contacts
with the United States as a whole, regardless of whether the contacts with the forum would be sufficient if considered alone. 2 The
court reasoned that if the defendant's contacts with the United
States satisfied the fairness test of the fifth amendment, then the
only limitation on the place of the trial would be the doctrine of
3
forum non conveniens.

DELAWARE

Eastman Kodak Co. v. StudiengesellschaftKohle, 392 F. Supp.
1152 (D. Del. 1975). Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that
it had not infringed defendant's patents, and claimed jurisdiction
under Delaware's long-arm statute" by serving process on the Secretary of State. Defendant sought dismissal contending that the
court had no personal jurisdiction over it, since it did not do business in Delaware. Defendant had no offices or agents in the State,
40. See Comment, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (1976).
41.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-411(c)(1959).

42. See von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1123-25 n.6 (1966).
43.

Cf. Hold v. Kolsters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).

44.

DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 382(a),(b) Supp. 1975. Delaware has a separate

statute regarding long-arm jurisdiction over foreign corporations, involving constructive service for non-qualified foreign corporations by service of process on the
Secretary of State.

JURISDICTION
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but it was the holder of several patents licensed to several Delaware corporations. This, plaintiff asserted, was sufficient for assumption of jurisdiction by the Delaware court. The court ruled
that for long-arm jurisdiction to exist, the corporation must be
doing business in Delaware, and the suit must arise from such
business. The court held that the first requirement was satisfied
by defendant's legal relations with its Delaware licensees, particularly the licensees' stipulated right to withhold payment from defendant if it failed to prevent infringement of its patent in Delaware. However, the court held that the second requirement had not
been met. In so ruling, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that since defendant had sued all of its competitors for infringement of the same patents, it was reasonably apprehensive of being

sued itself, and thus its suit was the result of defendant's business
activities in Delaware.
FLORIDA

Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla.
1975). Defendant foreign motor vehicle manufacturer filed motions
to quash service and dismiss complaints for lack of in personam
jurisdiction in private antitrust actions which had been transferred
to the court for consolidated pre-trial hearings.45 Nissan-USA is the
wholly-owned subsidiary of Nissan-Japan. Plaintiff contended
that defendant Nissan-Japan was subject to personal jurisdiction
under the Florida "doing business" statute46 or alternatively that
the court should pierce the corporate veil and find Nissan-USA to
be the alter-ego of the defendant. In a memorandum decision the
court declined to pierce the corporate veil but held that the defendant was doing business within Florida and subject to personal
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that while Nissan-USA was not
the alter-ego of defendant, the potential control of defendant over
45.

A total of ten different suits in the jurisdictions of California, Colorado,

Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas were presented for consolidation with the Florida action.
46.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 48.181 (1969). The statute provides for the service on

nonresidents engaging in business within the state. This section has been called

"Florida's short long-arm statute" and standing alone was viewed as grossly

insufficient. See Note, In Personam Jurisdiction-DueProcess and Florida's
Short "Long-Arm", 23 U.

FLA. L. REV. 336, 349 (1971). The instant case provides
an expansive view of the statute. But see Crown Club, Ltd. v. Honecker, 307 So.2d
889 (Fla. App. 1975) (where court had problems applying 48.181 to a nonresident). Subsequently in 1973 the Florida legislature passed a "single act" longarm statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (1973).
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the affairs of the wholly-owned American subsidiary as evidenced
by transfers of technology, business records and warranty arrangements, and the exchange of officers and directors between the defendants, allowed the court to find that the parent was doing busi47
ness within the State.
GEORGIA

Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476
(N.D. Ga. 1975). Toyota Motor Company, Ltd., a Japanese corporation, was served under Georgia's long-arm statute " in a products
liability action arising out of an automobile accident in Georgia.
Defendant Japanese corporation claimed insufficient contacts to
establish jurisdiction since the co-defendants in the chain of distribution' to the United States were also served. The court held that
the defendant's contacts with Georgia were sufficient to meet the
two step test that: (1) there be certain minimal contacts with the
forum state resulting in an affirmative act of the defendant, and
(2) it be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to defend a
suit brought in the state. The court reasoned that the defendant
anticipated that its product would end up in Georgia after it had
been placed in the international stream of commerce and had arrived in Georgia through the normal stream of commerce. Additionally, the court found the defendant able to sustain the cost of
litigation in a foreign jurisdiction as an inherent business expense.
HAWAII

Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th
Cir. 1969). Defendant, an English manufacturer, designed and
manufactured coach bodies for Vauxhall, an English chassis manufacturer. Vauxhall shipped the completed coaches to a Hawaiian
motor company which sold them to Maui Island Tours. Defendant
subsequently solicited business from and supplied parts to Maui
47. Other Florida "doing business" cases involving alien corporations are:
Hoffman v. Air India, 398 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1968); South Dade Farms v. Investment Bank S.A.L., 244 So.2d 555 (Fla. App. 1971).
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971).
49. Japanese manufacturer Toyota Motor Company, Ltd. sells the automobiles to the Japanese exporter, Toyota Motor Sales Company, Ltd. The American
importer, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., buys the automobiles from Toyota Motor

Sales Company, Ltd., and sells them to Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., an

independent Florida corporation. All these corporations are defendants in this
case.
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Island Tours. Plaintiff's claim of products liability for injuries suffered in Hawaii arose when a bus owned by Maui Island Tours

overturned." Duple claimed it did not commit a tortious act within
the State and that the long-arm statute' should not be applied
retroactively. The court sustained jurisdiction because the manu-

facturer had knowledge that the product was bound for Hawaii.
The court followed the interpretation of the Illinois courts of an
identical statute holding that jurisdiction need not be predicated
on the doing of some act within the state. In so ruling the court
noted the possible difficulty of enforcing any judgment in England. 5
ILLINOIS

Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.
1975). Defendant, a German corporation, sold its flash units to
German exporters and shipped them to American distributors at
the exporter's risk. Plaintiff alleged that the flash units infringed
its United States patent, and sought jurisdiction based on the
Illinois long-arm statute, 53 alleging that defendant's infringement
constituted tortious activity within the meaning of the statute.
Defendant contended that it did not have sufficient contacts with
Illinois to support jurisdiction. The court held that the active inducement of another to infringe a patent constitutes a tort whose
situs is the location of the injury, and that defendant engaged in
50. Other defendants were the driver of the bus, Maui Island Tours, Halea
Kala Motors (from whom Maui Island Tours purchased the bus), Vauxhall Motors, Ltd. and General Motors Corporation.
51. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 230-41.5 (Additional Supp. 1965).
52. The dissent viewed the majority opinion as a denial of due process and

an "unnecessary intrusion into the field of international relations." Believing that
different standards of jurisdiction should apply in international trade, the dissent
feared political, economic, or legal reprisals in international relations. Circuit
Judge Ely did not approve of the ex post facto application of the long-arm statute
and noted that Duple would have no occasion to resort to Hawaiian courts for
enforcement of its contract. Overall, the dissent felt that it was basically unfair
to force a corporation to go halfway around the world to defend a suit arising out
of acts committed solely in England, where a co-defendant could seek indemnity
from Duple in England. Judge Ely reasoned that the English courts would want
to fully re-examine the facts before enforcing any judgment against Duple. The
dissent favored legislative or executive action in implementing a national policy.
See Comment, Products Liability-Application of State Long Arm Statute to
Suits for Injuries Caused by Negligent Foreign Manufacture-DupleMotor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 130 (1970); 24 Sw. L.J.
532 (1970).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1968).
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such inducement through its activities, which involved not only
sales at the German border, but the making of distributorship
agreement and promotion of the product within the United States.
The court reasoned that formalities of title would not insulate a
foreign corporation where it knows that its product will infringe
another's patents. The court made no mention of the fact that this
defendant was an alien corporation, nor did it address the question
of what constituted sufficient minimum contact with Illinois so as
to assert jurisdiction over an alien corporation.
IOWA

Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Industries,Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506
(E.D. Mich. 1975). Plaintiff, an Iowa corporation, which had contracted with a Michigan corporation54 to purchase three electrohydraulic drop forging hammers manufactured by a German corporation," sued the two corporations for defects in the hammers.
Defendant German corporation moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction claiming that its acts were not within the purview of the long-arm statute. 6 Alternatively defendant asserted
that its acts did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts required by due process. The court held that plaintiff had established the existence of a contract with the German defendant by
means of implied and express warranties and was therefore within
the scope of the long-arm statute. Additionally, the court found
that since the contract had a "substantial connection" with the
forum state, the application of the long-arm statute was within the
requirements of federal due process. The court reasoned that the
minimum contacts were established by the size of the contract, the
attempts of service employees to fix the malfunctions, and the
probability of future sales activity within the forum. 7
KENTUCKY

Davis Elliot Co. Inc. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d
1176 (6th Cir. 1975). Defendant, a utility company, which operated
54. Letts Industries, Inc. is a Michigan corporation not qualified to do business in Iowa.
55. Langenstein and Schemann AG (Lasco) is a West German corporation.
56. IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (1964).
57. The court looked at guidelines set out by the Eighth Circuit to determine
the issue of minimum contacts. Caesar's World, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 498
F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1974).
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on Grand Cayman Island contracted with plaintiff for the construction of utility lines on the island. Plaintiff sued over a contract dispute and sought jurisdiction under the Kentucky long-arm
statute 8 alleging that defendant was doing business in Kentucky,
and that his cause of action arose from defendant's activities in
Kentucky. Plaintiff further alleged that all of defendant's chief
officers were Kentucky residents, and that a meeting had been
held at the Kentucky office of the managing director to attempt
to settle the dispute, after which a letter confirming their agree-

ment had been sent under defendant's letterhead, giving a Lexington, Kentucky address. The court held that defendant was amenable to jurisdiction in Kentucky despite the fact that it had not
engaged in income-generating activity there. The court adopted a
"purposeful action" test, requiring that a defendant avail himself
of the privilege of acting in Kentucky, that the plaintiff's cause of
action arise from those activities, and that those activities have a
connection with Kentucky substantial enough to make the exercise
of jurisdiction reasonable. The court reasoned that this test will
ensure that defendants become involved with Kentucky only
through actions freely and intentionally done.
LOUISIANA

Wells v. English Electrical,Ltd., 60 F.R.D. 573 (W.D. La. 1973).
Plaintiff sued for damages allegedly caused by malfunction in a
diesel engine manufactured by the defendant, an English corporation. Defendant employed no agents in Louisiana, owned no
property and had no office within the State, was not authorized
to do business within the State, and had not contracted to supply
services within the State. Since 1969, the defendant had used
Midco, a Texas corporation, as the exclusive United States distributor of its engines and parts. The two parties were autonomous
corporations with no formal connections outside the distributorship agreement. To facilitate distribution within Louisiana, Midco

had established four in-state subdistributors. Plaintiff contended
that personal jurisdiction was proper under the Louisiana longarm statute,5 9 since defendant was doing business within the State.
The court held that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
58. Ky. REV. STAT. § 454.210 (1973). Kentucky's long-arm statute is similar
to the Illinois long-arm statute.
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (1968).
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proper, since substantial revenue was obtained from sales of defendant's products within the State." '
MASSACHUSETTS

Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 454 F.2d 527 (2d
Cir. 1972). American distributor of recreational vehicles instituted

suit against the Canadian distributor for tortiously inducing the
Italian manufacturer to breach its distributorship contract with
plaintiff and for maliciously interfering with a profitable business
relationship between the plaintiff and the manufacturer. Defendant appealed the granting of a preliminary injunction which
banned it from selling the minicycles within the United States.
Defendant had a wholly-owned subsidiary within Massachusetts
and plaintiff had significant minicycle sales within the State
through franchised dealers. Defendant claimed that personal jurisdiction under the Massachusetts long-arm statute"' was improper
since it had no place of business within the State and the tortious
injury should be measured at the plaintiff's principal place of business, in Pennsylvania. The court held that the plaintiff had shown
sufficient injury within the forum and that Bombardier had significantly entered the business life of Massachusetts; therefore, personal jurisdiction was proper. 2
MICHIGAN

Belke v. MetalmeccanicaPlast, S.P.A., 365 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.
Mich. 1973). Plaintiff Michigan citizen was injured while operating a machine manufactured by defendant Metalmeccanica and
imported by other parties into the United States.13 Plaintiff's ac60. For a similar case see Boykin v. A.B. Lindenkranar,252 So. 2d 467 (La.
App. 1971).
61. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 223A, § 3 (Additional Supp. 1975).
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the
person's...
(d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission
outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or en-

gages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue of goods used or consumed or services rendered in this commonwealth
62. See also Singer v. Piaggio & Co., 420 F.2d 679 (1st Cir. 1970) (injury
caused by defendant's motorscooter not sufficiently connected with forum to
sustain personal jurisdiction).
63. Danson Corporation, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, purchased the ma-

Spring 1976]

JURISDICTION

tion was based on the Michigan long-arm statute for tort claims,"
and alleged three theories for recovery: (1) negligence; (2) breach
of implied warranty; and (3) breach of express warranty. Metalmeccanica moved to dismiss the personal injury action, claiming
insufficient contacts to warrant jurisdiction when the machine was
purchased by another corporation, F.O.B., the Italian border. On
the issue of the express warranty claim the court determined that
the defendant had insufficient contacts under Michigan's longarm statute to constitute carrying on general business within the
State. It then held that jurisdiction could be exercised over all
three claims since the negligence and breach of implied warranty
claims specifically fell within the statute and all three claims arose
from the same transaction. The long-arm statute was found applicable because the manufacturer had placed the product into
the stream of commerce with the knowledge that it might be used
somewhere and cause injury.
MINNESOTA

Conwed Corporation v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497 (D.
Minn. 1975). Defendant French corporations, Nortene, S.A. and
Netlon, moved to dismiss the action against them by Conwed Corporation which sought a declaratory judgment on the validity and
use of certain patents. Plaintiff contended that a settlement meeting between the parties in Minnesota, correspondence concerning
the rights of the parties, and plaintiff's status as a bona fide pur-

chaser of the patent rights constituted sufficient minimum contacts. The court rejected plaintiff's contentions and granted the
motion to dismiss. The court found that while the seller of the
patent rights was amenable to jurisdiction, the defendants were
not since they had not directly participated in the sale. The court
reasoned that public policy favoring dispute settlement precluded
a determination that the settlement meeting and correspondence
were business transactions. While defendant's letters threatening
patent infringement action might be considered the use of personal
property under Minnesota's long-arm statutes,65 the court refused
to assume jurisdiction since the letters were in response to plaintiff's communication. 6
chine from Metalmeccanica and sold it to Peninsular Machinery Company. Peninsular sold the machine to plaintiff's employer, Metal Products Corporation.
64. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.715(2) (1968).
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1969); § 543.19 (Additional Supp. 1976).
66. See Ritter v. Volkswagenwerk GMBH, 322 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1970).
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MISSOURI

J.F. Pritchard& Co. v. Dow Chemical of Canada, Ltd., 331 F.
Supp. 1215 (W.D. Mo. 1971) aff'd 462 F.2d 998. Plaintiff corporation, assignee of its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary, sued
defendant Canadian corporation on a construction contract. The
assignment was made and suit was filed in Missouri after defendant agreed not to file suit in the Canadian courts. Plaintiff sought
jurisdiction under Missouri's long-arm statute, 7 alleging that defendant had sufficient contacts with Missouri since design and
telephone conferences had originated there, and plaintiff had
worked on the project. The court adopted five factors to be considered in determining whether a party's contacts with Missouri were
sufficient to render him amenable to jurisdiction: (1) the nature
and quality of the contacts with Missouri; (2) the quantity of those
contacts; (3) the relationship of plaintiff's cause of action to those
contacts; (4) the interest of Missouri in providing a forum for its
residents; and (5) the relative convenience or inconvenience to the
parties. The court found the first four factors sufficient to support
jurisdiction in this case, but dismissed the action on the grounds
that the relative convenience to the parties demanded that this
suit be tried in Canada. In so ruling the tourt noted that defendant
had already instituted suit in Canada, that a Canadian contract
was involved, that the plant and all records were located there, and
that the choice-of-law clause in the contract specified Canadian
law. The case illustrates the federal courts' willingness to consider
differences between alien and domestic corporations under the
issue of convenience.
MONTANA

Scanlan v. Norma ProjektilFabrick,345 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mont.
1972). Plaintiff alleged that injuries suffered while hunting in
Montana were caused by defectively manufactured ammunition
purchased in Idaho. Defendant Swedish manufacturer's sales contacts with the United States consisted of sales to an American
distributor who then sold the products throughout the United
States. The court held that the Montana long-arm statute " extended jurisdiction to all acts which collectively result in a tort
within the State. The court noted that due process was not denied when a manufacturer who intended that his products be
67.

68.

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (Additional Supp. 1976).
MONT. R. Civ. P. 4B (1964).
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generally distributed was held amenable to jurisdiction where
the products were found. 9
NEBRASKA

Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D.
Neb. 1975). Plaintiff airline passengers bought around-the-world
airline tickets, with portions booked on defendant Soviet airline,
from a travel agent in Nebraska. The travel agent had an express
agency agreement with Pan American World Airways which authorized it to sell tickets for the defendant. Due to a revolution in
Kabul, Afganistan, Aeroflot recommended an alternate flight from
Tashkent to Karachi. Upon arrival in Karachi, plaintiffs were allegedly forcibly detained at a remote terminal due to defendant's
failure to obtain permission to enter Pakistani air space. Plaintiffs
brought suit in Nebraska for damages under the Warsaw Convention. The defendant contested personal jurisdiction and moved to
dismiss. Noting that the Nebraska long-arm statute' provides for
personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or through an
agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's transacting
of any business in the State, the court held the authorization of
Pan American to sell tickets for defendant and the express agency
agreement between Pan American and Nebraskan travel agency

were sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction.'
NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mulhern v. HollandAmerica Cruises,393 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.H.
1975). Plaintiff New Hampshire resident was injured while on a
cruise in the Bahamas. She brought a diversity action in New
Hampshire against defendant, a Netherlands corporation which
organized and sold cruises, invoking jurisdiction under New
Hampshire's long-arm statute.72 Defendant's only contact with the
forum consisted of advertising in a state-wide newspaper and distribution of promotional material to local travel agencies. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted defendant's
69. For another case dealing with alien corporations see McIntosh v. Heil Co.,
350 F. Supp. 866 (D. Mont. 1972) (where jurisdiction was denied).
70. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1967).
71.

For another alien corporation case see Blum v. Kawaguchi, 331 F. Supp.

216 (D. Neb. 1971).

72. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 300:11 (1955). New Hampshire's long-arm statute
is similar to Delaware's, providing for constructive service in the case of nonqualifled corporations.
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motion, employing the following test: whether the defendant could
reasonably have anticipated that his actions would subject him to
New Hampshire jurisdiction. Since defendant did no more than
distribute promotional materials in the forum, the court held defendant's accountability in New Hampshire was not foreseeable.
The court noted that the element of foreseeability might provide
discretion in terms of the fairness of requiring an alien corporation
to litigate in the United States, but gave no indication of a willingness to apply a stricter standard to alien corporations.
NEW JERSEY

Reilly v. P.J. Wolff & Sohne, 374 F. Supp. 775 (D.N.J. 1974).
Plaintiff New Jersey resident was injured by a machine manufactured by defendant P.J. Wolff & Sohne, a West German corporation. Defendant claimed that contracts to buy its product were
consummated and performed entirely in Germany. Since the contract provided that any disputes were to be resolved under the
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce and not the law of Germany or New Jersey,
defendant claimed a denial of protection by New Jersey law. However, the court found that the three contracts negotiated between

New Jersey and Germany constituted business contacts sufficient
to enable the defendant to avail itself of New Jersey law. Defendant's motion to quash service of process under New Jersey's longarm statute " was denied because it knew the machine was going
to New Jersey and because most of the evidence was in New Jersey.
The court noted that it was fundamentally fair to require defendant to defend in New Jersey since plaintiff could not realistically
bring suit in Germany. 4
NEW YORK
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. of Wolfburg, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 328
N.Y.S.2d 653, 278 N.E.2d 895 (1972). Plaintiff purchased a
Volkswagen automobile in Germany and sued defendant for injuries sustained when the front wheel suspension collapsed while
driving in Germany. Defendant, a German parent corporation, is
not qualified to do business in New York, and exports automobiles
to the United States through Volkswagen of America, a wholly73. N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:4-4(c)(1).
74. See Van Eeuwen v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306
A.2d 79 (App. Div. 1973).
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owned subsidiary, likewise not qualified to do business in New
York. In New York State the franchised wholesale distributor was
World-Wide Volkswagen whose entire capital stock was owned by
American investors who were unrelated to either the parent or
subsidiary. Plaintiff contended that through its affiliates defendant was engaged in a regular and systematic course of business
in New York and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the
New York courts. 5 The court examined the relationship between
defendant and World-Wide and concluded that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was improper. The court reasoned that a
foreign corporation was never present under the "control" theory
unless a parent-subsidiary relationship was evident, " furthermore,
in effect the control must be so complete that the subsidiary has

become a department of the parent.
Carbone v. Ft. Eire Club, 47 A.D. 337, 336 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975).
Plaintiff, a New York resident, was injured in a fall on defendant's
premises, a horse racing track in the province of Ontario. Defendant was not qualified to do business in New York, had no office
or assets in New York, and had no agents within the State. The
defendant conducted advertising campaigns in western New York
and listed its Canadian phone number in a New York phone directory. The plaintiff contended that under New York law7 the defendant was generally doing business within the State and was subject to personal jurisdiction. The court held that the mere solicitation of business coupled with a New York telephone listing did not
constitute the requisite minimum contacts so as to be considered
to be doing business within the State.79 The court cautioned that
75. Plaintiff does not claim a direct transaction of business under N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & RULES § 302 (McKinney 1962) [hereinafter cited as CPLR] but uses
a doing business test available under CPLR § 301 to sustain jurisdiction: "A court
may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have
been exercised heretofore."
76. See Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, 15 N.Y.2d 97, 256
N.Y.S.2d 129, 204 N.E.2d 329 (1965) (where court based jurisdiction on agency
relationship); cf. Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
77. See Public Adm'r v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 278 N.Y.S.2d

378, 224 N.E.2d 877 (1967) (jurisdiction based on theory of piercing the corporate
veil); see also Karlin v. Avis, 326 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (piercing the
corporate veil allowed only in extreme circumstances).
78.

CPLR § 301.

79. See Miller Co. v. Noudar, Ltd., 24 App. Div.2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289
(1966).

364

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 9.345

enthusiasm for extending jurisdiction over foreign persons in foreign lands must be tempered by the realization that the same rule
may be reciprocally applied to United States citizens in other
countries."0
NORTH DAKOTA

Keller v. Clark Equipment Co., 367 F. Supp. 1350 (D. N.Dak.
1973). Plaintiffs negotiated and executed patent licensing agreements with defendant Clark Equipment A.G., a Swiss subsidiary
of Clark Equipment Company. During the contract negotiations a
close association between a division of Clark which operated in
North Dakota and Clark A.G. had developed. Plaintiffs, residents
of North Dakota, contended that service of process on Clark in
North Dakota was valid against Clark A.G. because of the actions
of defendant's employee in North Dakota in contacting plaintiffs
and because payments were made to plaintiffs in North Dakota.

The court sustained jurisdiction and held that service upon the
parent division was notice to Clark A.G. under North Dakota's
long-arm statute." One test cited by the court in determining
whether notice to the parent serves as notice to the subsidiary was
whether the subsidiary is a puppet of the parent. Other factors to
be considered in determining fairness in the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign corporation are: (1) the interest the forum
state has in protecting its citizens; (2) whether the courts of the
forum would be open to the foreign corporation to enforce the obligation against the resident; (3) an estimate of the inconveniences
which would result to the foreign corporation if trial were held
away from its home; (4) whether the claimant could afford to bring
the action in a foreign forum; and (5) whether the crucial witnesses
and evidence are to be found in the forum.
OHIO

Stewart v. Bus & Car Co., 293 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
Plaintiff bus driver brought a diversity suit in Ohio against Belgian
bus manufacturer, Bus & Car Co., for personal injuries sustained
80.

But see Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41,

227 N.E.2d 851, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967) (where court granted jurisdiction over English defendant corporation having an affiliated corporation in New
York which solicited business and made reservations in New York for defendant

in London),
81. N.D.R. Civ. P. § 4(b)(2) (1974).
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during work. Evidence showed defendant had sold two buses in
Ohio for a total of ninety thousand dollars. Plaintiff sought jurisdiction under Ohio's long-arm statute, which provides for personal
jurisdiction over a person who derives substantial revenue from
goods used or services rendered in Ohio.12 The court assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the revenue derived from the sale of the
buses in Ohio, noting that relegation of plaintiff's action to a
Belgian court would be a poor recourse.
PENNSYLVANIA

Crucible, Inc. v. Stora KopparbergsBergslags AB, 403 F. Supp.

9 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Defendant Swedish corporation moved to dismiss a patent infringement action claiming that its contacts with
the forum were casual and did not subject it to personal jurisdiction. 3 Defendant's products were bought in Sweden by its whollyowned American subsidiary and were subsequently resold to purchasers in this country, including fifteen regular customers within
Pennsylvania. The court held that Stora-Sweden was doing business within the State and within the reach of the state long-arm
statute. 84 The court reasoned that two separate grounds existed
under the statute for asserting personal jurisdiction: (1) the defendant was doing business within the State through direct or indirect shipments into Pennsylvania; 85 (2) Stora-Sweden was engaged in a series of similar acts for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit.8" The court found the assertion of personal jurisdiction
proper since Stora-Sweden had deliberately sought the benefits
and protection of the Commonwealth. 7
OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.382(A)(4) (Additional Supp. 1975).
83. Note that this is a case of federal question jurisdiction. Service was ob-

82.

tained under the long-arm statute. For an interesting contrast, also dealing with
patent infringement, see Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D.
Conn. 1975) (where court stated that appropriate test in patent infringement was
the aggregation of corporation's contacts with the United States).
84. PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 8309 (Purdon's Supp. Jan. 1976).
85. Id. § (a)(3).
86. Id. § (a)(1).
87. The Pennsylvania long-arm statute has been liberally applied to alien
corporations. See also Boeing Co. v. Spar Aerospace Products Ltd., 380 F. Supp.
101 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Canadian); Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1027
(W.D. Pa. 1974) (French); Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (Swedish).
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TEXAS

Murdock v. Volvo of America Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Tex.
1975). Plaintiffs, the wives of two persons killed in an automobile
accident, brought a products liability action against defendant
Swedish automobile manufacturer and its wholly-owned subsidiary. Plaintiffs contended that personal jurisdiction over the parent
was proper under the Texas long-arm statute8 because it was doing
business within Texas through the subsidiary. The court held that
the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof since they had
failed to establish: (1) the existence of an agency relationship between the parent and the subsidiary; or (2) the sufficient exercise
of dominion by the parent over the subsidiary such that the subsidiary became the parent's alter-ego. The court dismissed the complaint reasoning that as a general rule the relationship of parent

corporation and subsidiary corporation is not of itself sufficient to
subject a non-resident to personal jurisdiction.89
UTAH

Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp.
722 (D. Utah 1973). Defendants, European ski boot manufacturers,
moved to quash service made under Utah's long-arm statute"0 in
an action alleging infringement of plaintiff's patents. Defendants,
responding to allegations of contributory infringement 9 ' argued
that since their sales in Utah were insubstantial, they did not have
contacts with the State substantial enough to support jurisdiction.
After finding the necessary contacts in defendants' use of marks
and servicemarks in Colorado, the court held that the proper test
in cases of this nature should not be the extent of contacts within
Utah, but rather should be the extent of contacts with the United
States.2 The court reasoned that otherwise, defendant might ensure immunity from suit in the United States by holding sales in
any particular state to a minimum level.
88.
89.

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031(b)(3) (1964).
A similar treatment of the alien parent-subsidiary issue was outlined in a

previous case, Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-22 (Additional Supp. 1975). This statute is similar to the Illinois long-arm statute.
91,

Contributory infringement is the active inducement of another to infringe

a United States patent. See Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137
(7th Cir. 1975).
92. Accord, Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn.
1975); but see Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9
(W.D. Pa. 1975).
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VIRGINIA

Elefterious v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971).
Plaintiff, an injured merchant seaman, sued his vessel and its
owners for negligence and for wages due him when put ashore in
Portsmouth, Virginia. Defendant resisted jurisdiction under Virginia's long-arm statue9 3 claiming that plaintiff's injuries had no
relation to its activities in Virginia. The court held that while the
injury had no relation to the defendant's conduct of business in
Virginia, and could not alone support jurisdiction, the claim for
wages was connected to defendant's business and did provide a
basis for long-arm jurisdiction. The court reasoned that it might
hear plaintiff's other claims and therefore remanded the case. The
court made no mention of a different jurisdictional standard for
alien corporations but instead based its analysis on whether a cor-

poration not subject to service within Virginia had contacts with
the State sufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction.
WASHINGTON

Deutsch v. West Coast Machinery Co., 80 Wash.2d 707, 497 P.2d
1131 (1972). Plaintiff Deutsch was allegedly injured in a Boeing
factory by a press manufactured by Japanese corporation Kansai
Iron Works, Ltd. Third party defendant Kansai moved to dismiss
a cross-claim for indemnification filed by third party plaintiff,
Marubeni-Iida, Inc., a New York corporation which purchased the
press from Kansai and then resold it." While Kansai had sent
engineers and a replacement switch to Boeing in Washington, it
contended that it was not doing business in Washington, that submission to jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair
play, and that the Commerce Clause would be violated by the
burden placed on foreign commerce by the Washington courts. The
court ruled that Kansai was subject to jurisdiction under Washington's long-arm statute " because it knew the press was destined for
Washington and had transacted business in its activities with
93. VA. CODE § 8-81.2 (1975 Cum. Supp.). Virginia's long-arm statute is similar to the Illinois statute.
94. Kansai Iron Works, Ltd., a Japanese manufacturer, sold the press to
Marubeni-Iida Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation, which sold the press to

Marubeni-lida, Inc., a New York corporation. Marubeni-Iida, Inc. sold the press
to West Coast Machinery Company, a Washington corporation, which sold the
press to the Boeing Company. West Coast, Marubeni-Iida, Inc. and Kansai are
involved in this suit.
95.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962).
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Boeing. The Supreme Court of Washington held it would be easier
and fairer for defendants to appear in Washington than for the
plaintiff and witnesses to appear in Japan. The court enunciated
a three-step test for the assumption of jurisdiction: (1) the nonresident defendant foreign corporation must purposefully do some
act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the
case of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or
transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum
state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
WISCONSIN

CanadianBronze Co. v. Kenzler, 64 F.R.D. 79 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
Plaintiff Canadian corporation sued defendant Wisconsin
corporation for negligence in the performance of services and the
design of plaintiff's Canadian facility. Defendant impleaded two
foreign corporations, a Michigan company and its Canadian subsidiary, as third party defendants. Both sought to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. The defendant attempted to base personal
jurisdiction over the impleaded defendants upon the presence of
the third parties within the forum and the local nature of the
injury. The court examined the Wisconsin long-arm statute" and
found that neither corporation had engaged in substantial activity
in Wisconsin. While the misdesign or alleged negligence may have
occurred in Wisconsin, the injury occurred in Canada, not Wisconsin. Therefore, the court concluded that neither the Michigan
corporation nor its Canadian subsidiary could be impleadbd under
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 8
III.

CONCLUSION

The cases surveyed confirm several points:
(1) While a majority of courts still make no express distinction
between foreign and alien corporations, a minority does distinguish
96. See Williams v. Canadian Fishing Co., 8 Wash. App. 765, 509 P.2d 64
(1973) (mere subsidiary relationship with Washington corporation held insufficient contact to subject Canadian corporation to jurisdiction under long-arm
statute); Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 487 P.2d 234 (1971)
(court upholds jurisdiction but states that contacts of alien corporation must be
greater than those of domestic corporation).
97.

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (1957).

98. See also Davis v. Mercier-Freres, 368 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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one from the other. Among those courts drawing no express distinction, many have reached the same result as the minority by manipulation of minimum contacts analysis, and a few have done so
through the use of forum non conveniens.
(2)

Cases involving alien corporations brought under the jurisdic-

tion of the adjudicating forum through the use of a long-arm statute
follow a limited number of fact patterns, each of which has a bearing
on the policy considerations involved.
(3) There is a need, if not for a different standard for foreign corporations, then for a mode of minimum contacts analysis which takes
into account the peculiar circumstances involved in an alien corporation long-arm case.
The question of differentiation between foreign and alien corporations has been explicitly addressed in relatively few decisions.
The majority of courts not only fail to draw the distinction, but
seem to ignore the issue altogether, treating non-qualified alien
corporations the same as any other corporation not licensed to do
business in the forum. 9 To an extent they are justified in doing so,
since the foundation of the minimum contacts test is the analysis
of a set of facts, and not the application of one mechanical formula
or another. Yet cases involving alien corporations present peculiar
circumstances that a court should consider in its analysis. In the
majority of jurisdictions these circumstances remain unaddressed.
Where courts have been willing to distinguish the two types of
corporations, they have adopted one of two approaches. Some
courts, by requiring that an alien corporation need have contacts
only with the United States,' hold them to a standard which will
support jurisdiction on a showing of fewer or more tenuous contacts
than is required of a foreign corporation. However, the application
of this standard appears to be primarily limited to patent infringement cases, and even there it has not been applied universally.'0 '
99. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975);
Davis H. Elliott Co., Inc. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir.
1975); Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 392 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1975); Marshall Exports, Inc. v. C.A. Phillips, 385 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd 507
F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1974).
100. See Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975);
Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973);
Alliance Clothing, Ltd. v. District Court, 532 P.2d 351 (D. Colo. 1975); see also 9
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (1976).
101. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Studiengessellschaft Kohle, 392 F. Supp.
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Other courts have taken a different approach and have adopted the
reasoning of the Duple case. ' These courts hold that before an
alien corporation will be required to defend a suit brought on the
basis of long-arm jurisdiction, a stronger showing of contacts with
the adjudicating forum must be made than would be required in
the case of a foreign corporation. Typically, the additional requirement imposed is one or both of the following: (1) it must have been
foreseeable that the product (in a products liability case) would
have been placed within the broad stream of commerce in the
United States; (2) the injury complained of must result from the
use intended by the manufacturer.' 3 Only where these further requirements are met will these courts hold an alien corporation
amenable to their jurisdiction. The application of this standard
appears to be limited mainly to products liability cases.
Even those courts that do not distinguish between foreign and
alien corporations have been increasingly willing to deal with the
issue implicitly through manipulation of the minimum contacts
test."" Many courts have developed factors to be considered in
connection with minimum contacts analysis, and often "convenience" is listed as a factor to be considered. Thus, while the courts
consider the same factors in connection with both foreign and alien
corporations, the question of convenience will be more significant
in the case of an alien corporation. Those courts that have not
enumerated a list of factors to be considered reach the same result
by holding that the contacts asserted are insufficient where it
seems likely that such contacts would be upheld in the case of a
foreign corporation. 1 15 However, at least one court has approached
this problem under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.'"0
1152 (D. Del. 1975); Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F.
Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
102. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).

103. 417 F.2d at 235. See also Scanlan v. Norma Projektil Fabrik, 345 F. Supp.
292 (D. Mont. 1972); Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 487 P.2d
234 (1971). In the latter case, the court expanded on the requirement of knowledge, which had received minimal treatment in Duple, and added the requirement that the use resulting in injury be the one intended by the manufacturer.

Id. at 242.
104. See J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chemical of Canada, Ltd., 331 F. Supp.
1215 (W.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd 462 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1972).
105. See Murdock v. Volvo of American Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Tex.
1975).
106. See note 104 supra. The basis of the holding in this case is unclear, for

while the court lists convenience as a factor to be considered in its minimum
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One possible reason for the failure of the courts to distinguish
foreign and alien corporations is explained in the limited number
of fact patterns. In most cases, the alien corporation has offices or
agents within the adjudicating forum, or at least within the United
States.0 7 If not, it may be doing business through an independent
distributor large enough to answer for an injury within the forum.
Since plaintiffs in such cases often utilize more traditional bases
of jurisdiction, there is no need to resort to long-arm service.
When this need does arise, the problem involved will be essentially that of a foreign corporation, since plaintiff will be attempting to reach an agent (or other appropriate person) located in
another forum within the United States.
Typically an injured party resorts to long-arm jurisdiction over
an alien manufacturer when its distributor has insufficient assets
to answer for the damage done because it is either a subsidiary or
an exclusive distributor with minimum capitalization,""8 or because it is a small independent retailer.'0 ' These situations present
considerations which are not specifically addressed under the minimum contacts test, but which come within the realm of "fair play
and substantial justice." 0 These considerations are: (1) whether
the defendant has attempted to structure its international commercial transactions so as to artificially insulate itself from liability; (2) whether the "deep pocket theory" should be applied on
an international level; and (3) the policy considerations weighing
against the exercise of jurisdiction. These factors may be concontacts analysis, it discusses the issue under the heading of forum non
conveniens, which appears to be the ultimate basis of its holding. For a fuller

discussion of the forum non conveniens issues involved, see 20 STAN. L. REV. 57
(1967).
107.
1972).

See Engine Specialities, Inc., v. Bombardier, Ltd., 454 F.2d 527 (1st Cir.

108. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.
1975); daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr.
62 (1967).
109. See Alliance Clothing, Ltd. v. District Court, 532 P.2d 351 (D. Colo.
1975). For other fact patterns of this type see Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa,
443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971) (no distributor involved); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Studienesellschaft Kohle, 302 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1975) (plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action afraid that defendant, who had sued all of plaintiffs competition, was about to sue it); Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362
F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (injunctive relief against foreign corporation's American distributors ineffective, since the corporation could easily choose or create
new distributors).
110. Millihen v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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sidered within the framework of substantial fairness under the
traditional minimum contacts test, thus lessening the need for
their explicit consideration under a separate test for international
corporations. This does not mean that they should be ignored.
There are significant policy issues involved in the exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction over alien corporations. Those most commonly raised are: (1) any judgment procured on the basis of such
jurisdiction is likely to be unenforceable;"' (2) the assertion of2
jurisdiction will adversely affect United States foreign relations,"
placing an undue burden on foreign commerce and violating the
exclusive power of Congress to regulate trade with foreign
nations;'' and (3) it is unfair to require an alien corporation to
travel halfway around the world to defend itself on the basis of an
isolated act."'
The unenforceability argument, though occasionally called a red
herring," ' is perhaps the most persuasive argument against the
assertion of long-arm jurisdiction. On the national level, the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution"' guarantees that a
judgment rendered on the basis of long-arm jurisdiction will be
honored in sister-state proceedings, so long as due process requirements are met. Because there is no such guarantee" 7 in an international long-arm case, a court dealing with a foreign party or parties
runs a higher risk of having its judgment dishonored. For this
reason, substantial contacts should be required in cases involving
alien corporations. However, where the defendant has assets
within the forum or within the United States, or where plaintiff
seeks injunctive relief, the unenforceability argument has no
111. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir.
1969).
112. 417 F.2d at 237.
113. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. See also, 18 WAYNE L. REV. supra note 23, at 1592.
114. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir.
1969).
115. 18 WAYNE L. REV., note 23 supra, at 1592. The note cited contends that
unenforceability of its judgments is not a matter of concern to the court rendering
them, and that it is the plaintiff who should properly be concerned about the
expenditure of time and money involved in procuring a worthless judgment.
Needless to say, courts are, and should be, concerned about the enforceability of
their judgments, for if they can be ignored with impunity, they are worthless as
social institutions.
116. U.S. CONST., art, IV, § 1. See 18 WAYNE L. REv., note 23 supra, at 1592.
117. The court in Duple addresses this problem, noting that an English court
would have to re-adjudicate the issues involved there.
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merit. '" In those cases the prospective judgment will be enforceable without resort to foreign courts.
The contention that the assertion of jurisdiction will deleteriously affect international relations is not persuasive. While a possibility of international reprisals certainly exists,"' it seems unlikely to occur frequently since the adjudicating forum seeks only
to treat alien and foreign corporations alike. Long-arm jurisdiction
is asserted directly against an alien manufacturer in relatively few
cases, and the alien corporation has the opportunity to spread the
cost among its customers either directly through pricing, or indirectly by insuring against the risk.
The question of whether such jurisdiction places an undue burden on foreign commerce merits consideration. It can be argued
that Congress has exclusive power to regulate both foreign and
domestic commerce. Therefore, if international long-arm jurisdiction violates congressional power as regards foreign commerce,
then interstate long-arm jurisdiction violates congressional power
under the commerce clause, and the concept of long-arm jurisdiction is itself invalid. This argument gives Congress an opportunity

to preempt the field as regards alien corporations, providing a
uniform standard and avoiding the criticism that alien corporations have no way of knowing in which forums they may be held
liable for a given act.
In light of the due process questions involved, the unfairness
argument is perhaps the most complex of the arguments, touching
as it does on questions of discrimination and harassment, inconvenience, and unfamiliarity with governing law. While all of these
factors can be cited to counter the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction without a showing of substantial contacts, the following considerations, among others, support thc assertion of jurisdiction: (1)
an alien corporation can spread the cost of litigating abroad
among its customers and is therefore more able to bear the burden
than an individual plaintiff; (2) alien corporations should be no
118. See Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722
(D. Utah 1973).
119. As stated by Professors Von Mehren and Trautman: "[I]n establishing

bases for jurisdiction in the international sense, a legal system cannot confine its
analysis solely to its own ideas of what is just, appropriate, and convenient. To a
degree it must take into account the views of other communities concerned.
Conduct that is overly self-regarding with respect to the taking and exercise of
jurisdiction can disturb the internationalorder and produce political, economic
and legal reprisals." (Emphasis added.) von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1127 (1966).
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less responsible than foreign corporations for the harm they do in
a given forum. To hold otherwise would encourage laxity among
alien corporations producing goods for United States consumption;
(3) the case should be heard where the injury occurred, since that
is where the witnesses and evidence are likely to be located.
As mentioned above, one or more of these policy considerations
are often implicit in the reasoning of a given court, even where no
explicit distinction is drawn between foreign and alien corporations. Minimum contacts analysis, being factual and based on notions of fair play and substantial justice, is perhaps not amenable
to differing standards for foreign and alien corporations. The test
is analytic, not mechanical, and in the case of either a foreign or
an alien corporation the goal is the same-to submit the corporation to long-arm jurisdiction only when fair. But thus far courts
have been unaware of or unwilling to deal with the peculiar circumstances presented by an international as opposed to an interstate long-arm case. These circumstances arise for the most part
from the differences between the federal and international systems
of law which in turn give rise to policy considerations under which

the fact patterns involved are especially significant. In all cases,
whether interstate or international, minimum contacts analysis
should encompass a cost-benefit approach in evaluating the interests of the plaintiff, the prospective defendant, and the adjudicating forum. The possible costs are higher when an alien corporation is involved, since a judgment against it is not guaranteed full
faith and credit and may have international repercussions. In
cases of this sort, a more extensive analysis might be appropriate.
The analysis would include a consideration of three factors. First,
has the defendant deliberately structured its international transactions so as to artificially insulate itself from liability in the
United States? If so, a court may be more willing to assert jurisdiction despite the potential costs involved. Secondly, what forum
is fairest to both parties? This involves a consideration of whether
extreme hardship is involved in requiring an alien corporation to
defend in the United States,1 20 and whether there are special
reasons for adjudicating the dispute at the situs of the injury.
Thirdly, would a judgment be enforceable, and would there be a
possiblity of retaliation? These latter factors present considera120. For a case in which this was a controlling consideration, see J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chemical of Canada, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D. Mo.
1971), aff'd 462 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1972).
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tions not present where a judgment is guaranteed full faith and
credit.
At present, the majority of courts have not addressed these questions explicitly, although some have been implicitly considered in
their opinions. Perhaps the best argument that can be made is that
a court should address these questions and consider them in deciding the propriety of international long-arm jurisdiction.,', Where a
court is unwilling to do so, these factors may enter into its decision
under the broad guise of fairness. Where the defendant's home
forum is ready to assert jurisdiction, the possibility exists for a
forum non conveniens dismissal based on these considerations.
However, in light of the undeveloped nature of this doctrine and
its inherent limitations, this possibility is slim at best. 22
In Hanson v. Denkla, the Supreme Court states, "As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between states,
the need for jurisdiction over non-residents has undergone a
similar increase. ' ' As this increased flow spills out into the international realm, followed by a corresponding increase in the need
for international long-arm jurisdiction, an increasingly sophisticated analysis is needed to take into account those factors not

present between states.
John D. Gleissner, David C. Veeneman
& S. Rodgers Wheaton
121. See Carbone v. Ft. Erie Jockey Club, Ltd., 47 App. Div.2d 337, 366
N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975). In this case the New York court, after denying jurisdiction,
cautioned that enthusiasm for the extension of jurisdiction over aliens in foreign
lands must be tempered by the expectation that the same rule will be reciprocally
applied in remote countries to our citizens.
122. For a general discussion of forum non conveniens as regards international
adjudication, see 20 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1967).
123. 357 U.S. at 250-51.

